The Right to Regulate in Africa’s International Investment Law Regime by Chidede, Talkmore
[437] 
TALKMORE CHIDEDE* 
The Right to Regulate in Africa’s International 
Investment Law Regime 
Introduction ...................................................................................... 437 
I. Global Investment Law for Africa ........................................ 440 
II. Africa’s Continental Investment Law ................................... 443 
III. African Regional Investment Law ........................................ 449 
IV. SADC FIP ............................................................................. 451 
A. COMESA Common Investment Agreement ................. 454 
B. ECOWAS Supplementary Act ...................................... 456 
C. EAC Model Investment Code ........................................ 459 
V. African Investment Regulation at the Bilateral Level ........... 460 
Conclusion ....................................................................................... 466 
INTRODUCTION 
frica’s international investment law regime is shaped by a 
complex, fragmented, and heterogeneous network of bilateral, 
regional, and international legal instruments. More precisely, the 
regime comprises customary international law rules, bilateral, regional, 
and plurilateral investment treaties, and free trade agreements (FTAs) 
with investment provisions or chapters.1 Almost every African country 
has currently concluded at least one investment treaty with countries 
inside or outside Africa.2 The treaties generally enshrine investment 
* Researcher at the Trade Law Centre and Doctoral Candidate at the University of the
Western Cape, South Africa. 
1 See generally Investment Policies and Bilateral Investment Treaties in Africa: 
Implications for Regional Integration, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION  
FOR AFRICA (Feb. 2016), https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/eng_ 
investment_landscaping_study.pdf [hereinafter UNECA (2016)]. 
2 UNECA (2016), supra note 1, at 16; see International Investments Agreement 
Navigator, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ 
A 
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promotion and protection standards, although they may differ in nature, 
scope, and interpretation. Most of the international investment 
agreements (IIAs) signed and ratified by African countries were signed 
in the 1960s with advanced European economies and the United States 
because they were main sources of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
Africa.3 These IIAs became commonly known as North-South Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs). Nowadays, developing economies like 
China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia are increasingly becoming top FDI 
sources for Africa and, as a consequence, more and more IIAs are 
concluded between African countries and such economies, the so-
called South-South IIAs. 
Overall, IIAs were concluded for various reasons including social, 
economic, and political motivations. African countries signed IIAs as 
tools to attract FDI from developed nations, to deepen regional 
integration,4 and to cultivate economic and diplomatic relations with 
industrialized countries.5 FDI has been and is still considered by many 
as an incentive for enhancing economic growth and development, 
injecting capital in local industries, creating jobs, and alleviating 
poverty.6 There is an extensive debate as to whether IIAs attract FDI,7 
or whether FDI fosters economic development, job creation, and 
poverty alleviation.8 The role of FDI in Africa’s development has been 
IIA (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). The UNCTAD International Investment Agreements 
Database is the most comprehensive database for international investment agreements 
combined by UNCTAD. 
3 See generally Makane Moise Mbengue & Stefanie Schacherer, The “Africanisation” 
of International Investment Law: The Pan-African Investment Code and the Reform of the 
International Investment Regime, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 414, 414 (2017). 
4 UNECA (2016), supra note 1, at 21. See also Yao Graham, BITs a Challenge to 
Regional Integration in Africa, 290/291 THIRD WORLD RESURGENCE 5, 5–7 (2014), 
http://www.twn.my/title2/resurgence/2014/290-291/econ1.htm. 
5 See generally FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS (Olivier de Schutter et 
al. eds., 2013). 
6 See, e.g., Genevieve Fox, A Future for International Investment? Modifying BITs to 
Drive Economic Development, 46 GEO. J. INT’L L. 229, 229 (2014). 
7 See generally THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: 
BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND INVESTMENT 
FLOWS (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009); Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicolas P. 
Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 72 (2005); Matthias Busse, Jens Königer & Peter 
Nunnenkamp, FDI Promotion Through Bilateral Investment Treaties: More Than a Bit?, 
146 REV. WORLD ECON. 147 (2010); Kevin P. Gallagher & Melissa B.L. Birch, Do 
Investment Agreements Attract Investment-Evidence from Latin America?, 7 J. WORLD INV. 
& TRADE 91 (2006). 
8 See generally Schutter et al., supra note 5. 
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a debatable topic in Africa. Over the years, Africa has attracted 
voluminous FDI flows from western countries, yet underdevelopment, 
abject poverty, and high unemployment remain common on the 
continent.9  
Immediately after independence in the 1960s, most African 
countries were facing stagnant economic growth, so they were 
prompted to conclude BITs with advanced economies to promote more 
inward FDI and boost economic growth. Consequently, African 
countries began to adopt economic policies or plans that carved out 
regulatory autonomy or space of host states in favor of investment 
promotion and protection standards.10 Developed nations (the 
European Union countries, Canada, and the United States), on the other 
hand, were keen on concluding BITs with African countries to protect 
their citizens investing in Africa.11 As such, BITs were designed by 
capital-exporting countries with a view of providing investors with core 
investment protections such as free movement of capital, access to 
international arbitration, and protection against government 
expropriation.  
This Article seeks to examine the contemporary international 
investment law framework of Africa to determine whether such 
framework preserves host states’ right to regulate investment in public 
interest. It particularly explores and analyses the IIAs concluded by 
African countries at global, regional, and bilateral levels. The Article 
is divided into four parts: global investment law for Africa, African 
continental investment law, regional investment law, and lastly, 
Africa’s investment law regime at bilateral levels.  
9 See generally Emmanuel A. Cleeve, Yaw Debrah & Zelealem Yiheyis, Human Capital 
and FDI Inflows: An Assessment of the African Case, 74 WORLD DEV. 1, 1–14 (2015). 
10 FOLA ADELEKE, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY IN AFRICA: 
EXPLORING A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH TO INVESTMENT REGULATION AND 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 7 (2018). 
11 See Magalie Masamba, Africa and Bilateral Investment Treaties: To BIT or Not?, 
POLITY (Jul. 23, 2014), http://www.polity.org.za/article/africa-and-bilateral-investment-
treaties-to-bit-or-not-2014-07-23. This source indicates that developed countries executed 
BITs in order to set up their business operations in developing countries, which offered 
lower labor costs and cheaper raw materials. 
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I 
GLOBAL INVESTMENT LAW FOR AFRICA 
African countries have signed and ratified multilateral or plurilateral 
agreements pertinent to international investment regulation. Notably, 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs);12 the WTO General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS);13 the Convention Establishing the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA Convention);14 the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States 
and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention);15 and the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (New York Convention).16 As parties to these treaties, African 
states have agreed to be bound by the terms and to take all political, 
legal, and administrative steps necessary to implement the core 
imperatives of the treaties as encapsulated in their provisions.  
TRIMs regulate investment measures with trade-restrictive and 
distorting effects, while GATS regulate trade in services and contain 
rules relevant to investment (particularly Mode 3 of supplying 
services).17 Mode 3—also known as commercial presence—implies 
that a service supplier of one member establishes a territorial presence, 
through methods including ownership or lease of premises in another 
member’s territory to provide a service.18 That is FDI. Today, there are 
thirty-nine African countries that are members of the WTO.19 As WTO 
members, these African countries are legally bound by the investment 
provisions of the TRIMs and GATS.  
12 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 
U.N.T.S. 186. 
13 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Annex 1B, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
183, 33 I.L.M. 1167. 
14 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, Oct. 11, 
1985, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99. The MIGA Convention was signed in 1985 and came into operation 
in 1988. 
15 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter Convention on the Settlement]. 
16 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, May 
20, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. 
17 General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 13, art. I(2). 
18 Id. art. I(2)(c). 
19 The current WTO membership can be found on the WTO website. Members and 
Observers, WTO.ORG, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
(last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
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The MIGA Convention provides risk insurance to foreign investors 
against political risks such as expropriation, transfer restriction, breach 
of contract, non-honoring of financial obligations, as well as war, 
terrorism, and civil disturbance. The Convention also provides 
investment dispute resolution on a case-by-case basis. Fifty-three 
African countries are currently members of the MIGA Convention.20 
The ICSID Convention creates the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and provides for the 
resolution of investor-state disputes and interstate disputes. ICSID 
provides several services including:  
• Arbitrations under the ICSID Convention
• Arbitrations under the Additional Facility
• Conciliations under the ICSID Convention
• Conciliations under the Additional Facility
• Fact-finding proceedings; non-ICSID investor-state arbitrations
(for example, under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules); non-
ICSID state-to-state disputes (for example, under free trade
agreements); mediations; and other alternative dispute resolution
cases.21 Forty-seven of the African countries are signatory and
contracting states and legally bound by the ICSID Convention.22
The New York Convention regulates the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.23 The New York Convention 
requires domestic courts of contracting states to recognize and enforce 
arbitration awards made in other contracting states. The Convention is 
the principal international instrument on the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards—arbitral awards made in the 
territory of another state other than where recognition and arbitration is 
sought.24 The Convention requires each contracting state to “recognize 
arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the 
20 Member Countries, WORLD BANK GROUP, https://www.miga.org/member-countries 
(last visited Mar. 18, 2019). A list of MIGA Convention member countries can be found on 
MIGA’s website. 
21 See ICSID Services Overview, WORLD BANK, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/ 
services/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). 
22 Database of ICSID Member States, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISP., 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/Database-of-Member-States.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2019). A database of ICSID’s Membership can be found on the ICSID website.  
23 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
supra note 16.  
24 Convention on the Settlement, supra note 15, art. 1(1). 
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rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.”25 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, among other African countries, have 
incorporated or domesticated the New York Convention.26 This means 
the Convention has become part of South Africa and Zimbabwe’s 
municipal laws.27 
The aforementioned treaties do not contain substantive provisions 
on the right to regulate for states. The text and content of the treaties 
were heavily influenced by the Western capital-exporting economies 
who were keen on maintaining international rules favorable to their 
social and economic interests.28 Emphasis was placed on concluding 
investment treaties as instruments for investor protection and 
promotion. The treaties incorporate suggestions to regulatory space 
which are viewed as an impediment to the principal purpose of the 
treaties. Developing countries (including Africa) were merely 
investment rule consumers in the North-South BITs.29 They lacked 
sufficient capacity to negotiate public policy and development issues 
into these IIAs, or to analyze the practical legal and policy 
consequences of negotiating such agreements.30  
25 Convention on the Settlement, supra note 15, art. 3. 
26 See International Arbitration Act 15 of 2017 (S. Afr.); Arbitration Act, Chapter 7:15, 
1996, Zimbabwe. 
27 For more information and a discussion on domestication of international treaties, see 
Gov’t of the Rep. of Zimbabwe v. Fick, 2012 ZASCA 122 (Sept. 20, 2012); see also Glenister 
v. President of the Rep. of S. Africa (2011), (6) All SA 2 (CC) (S. Afr.); see generally G.
Ferreira & A. Ferreira-Snyman, The Incorporation of Public International Law into
Municipal Law and Regional Law Against the Background of the Dichotomy Between
Monism and Dualism, 17 PER: POTCHEFSTROOMSE ELEKTRONIESE REGSBLAD 1471
(2014); see generally David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-
Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 129 (1999).
28 See Emmanuel Tetteh Layrea & Franziska Sucker, The Importance of an African 
Voice in, and Understanding and Use of, International Economic Law, in INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW: VOICES OF AFRICA, 10 (Emmanuel Tetteh Layrea et al. eds., 2012) 
[hereinafter Layrea & Sucker]. See also Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of 
International Investment Agreements, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES ON FOREIGN DIRECT 
INVESTMENT: BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES, DOUBLE TAXATION TREATIES, AND 
INVESTMENT FLOWS 13–35 (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa E. Sachs eds., 2009). 
29 See Wolfgang Alschner & Dmitriy Skougarevskiy, Rule-Takers or Rule-Makers? A 
New Look at African Bilateral Investment Treaty Practice (June 7, 2016), TOM Special 
Issue on Int’l Arbitration Involving Commercial and Investment Disputes in Africa 
(forthcoming), https://snis.ch/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/wp-alschner_skugarevskiy_ 
africa_tdm_20may2016-final.pdf. 
30 ADELEKE, supra note 10, at 156. 
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II 
AFRICA’S CONTINENTAL INVESTMENT LAW 
Africa has no legally binding and continent-wide instrument on 
investment regulation. The international investment regulatory 
framework is fragmented, consisting of BITs, regional investment 
agreements, and free trade agreements with investment provisions. 
Nonetheless, African countries, under the auspices of the African 
Union (A.U.), have developed and adopted a nonbinding continent-
wide investment code, the Pan-African Investment Code (PAIC).31 The 
PAIC aims to create a balanced investment regime that promotes and 
protects investments while conserving the policy space for host states.32 
It contains many references and inferences to the right to regulate of 
host states. The preamble of the PAIC, for instance, expressly refers to 
the right of A.U. member states to regulate all investment-related 
aspects within their territories to promote sustainable development 
objectives.33 In principle, preambles do not necessarily constitute 
normative standards that are legally enforceable, but they have an 
important role as to how IIAs will be interpreted in the event of a 
dispute between state parties or between investors and host states.34 
History has, however, shown that international investment arbitral 
tribunals do not depend on the preamble to influence interpretation of 
the treaty’s text.35  
In addition, the PAIC consists of numerous substantive provisions, 
including the right of host governments to regulate admitted 
investments in accordance with their laws and regulations,36 and the 
right to adopt measures concerning environmental preservation, 
international peace and security, national security interests,37 and 
promoting national development (including through performance 
31 African Union Commission [AUC], Draft Pan-African Investment Code (Dec. 2016), 
https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/32844-doc-draft_pan-african_investment_code_ 
december_2016_en.pdf [hereinafter Draft Pan-African Investment Code].  
32 ADELEKE, supra note 10, at 131. 
33 Draft Pan-African Investment Code, supra note 31, pmbl. at 3. 
34 RUDOLPH DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 20 
(1995). See also Max H. Hulme, Preambles in Treaty Interpretation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 
1281, 1296–97 (2016). 
35 Christina L. Beharry & Melinda E. Kuritzky, Going Green: Managing the 
Environment Through International Investment Arbitration 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 391 
(2015). 
36 Draft Pan-African Investment Code, supra note 31, art. 5. 
37 Id. art. 14. 
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requirements and local content).38 Performance requirements are 
significant because they can serve as a tool for economic development 
policies.39 For instance, requirements for technology transfers or the 
employment of local workers can help materialize beneficial spillover 
effects for the host state.40 
Moreover, the PAIC includes a list of exceptions to the application 
of most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) and national treatment 
obligations to investors and investments in order to preserve public 
interests. For instance, Article 8(2) provides that a state does not violate 
the MFN clause if it adopts measures that are “designed and applied to 
protect or enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public 
health, safety and the environment.”41 Closely related, Article 8(5) 
provides that the MFN principle “does not oblige a member state to 
extend to the investors of any other country the benefit of any treatment 
contained in an existing or future customs union, free trade area or 
international agreement to which the investor’s home state is not a 
party, or any international agreement or domestic legislation relating to 
taxation.”42  
With reference to national treatment, Article 10(3) of the PAIC 
permits states to grant investments and investors preferential treatment 
in accordance with their respective domestic legislations.43 Article 
10(4) preserves the right of states to deny an investor the benefits of the 
PAIC and “to grant special and differential treatment to any investor 
and investment in such cases, though not limited to instances where: 
the investor does not have substantial business activities in the Member 
State; or the investor is engaged in activities inimical to the economic 
interest of Member States.”44 Article 10(6) of the PAIC further 
prescribes that national treatment does not apply “to subsidies or grants 
provided to a government or a State enterprise, including government-
supported loans, guarantees and insurance; or to taxation measures 
aimed at ensuring the effective collection of taxes, except where this 
38 Id. arts. 17, 15. 
39 Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 3, at 433. 
40 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development, 99, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/PCB/2015/5 
(2015).  
41 Draft Pan-African Investment Code, supra note 31, art. 8(2). 
42 Id. art. 8(5). 
43 Id. art. 10(3). 
44 Id. ch. 2, art. 10(3). 
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results in arbitrary discrimination.”45 It is worth mentioning that the 
implementation of these exceptions does not entitle an investor to 
compensation for any competitive disadvantages.46 
More importantly, the PAIC contains an entire chapter on investors’ 
obligations,47 which is rare in traditional BITs.48 The PAIC allows host 
governments to impose certain obligations on investors, including to 
comply with corporate governance standards,49 to adhere to 
sociopolitical obligations,50 to refrain from bribery,51 to adhere to 
corporate social responsibility standards,52 to use natural resources in a 
responsible manner,53 and to comply with business ethics and human 
rights.54 The PAIC also comprises provisions regulating state 
contracts,55 public-private partnerships,56 labor issues,57 human 
resources development,58 and the promotion of technology transfer and 
clean technologies,59 and environmental and consumer protection.60 
With regard to dispute resolution, the PAIC gives host governments 
the discretion to implement investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), 
thereby offering a middle-ground solution to African states that are 
either pro-ISDS or anti-ISDS.61 The PAIC’s ISDS provisions articulate 
45 Id. art. 10(6). 
46 Id. ch. 2, art. 10(8). 
47 Id. ch. 4. 
48 See, e.g., Roussalis v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/1, Award, ¶ 871 (Dec. 7, 
2011), where the ICSID Tribunal conceded that “the BIT imposes no obligations on 
investors, only on contracting states.” 
49 Draft Pan-African Investment Code, supra note 31, art. 9. Investors are obliged to 
comply with national and international standards of corporate governance for the sector 
concerned. 
50 Id. ch. 4, art. 20. Investors are required to adhere to the principle of noninterference 
in internal political affairs as well as the noninterference in intergovernmental relations, 
including for instance the respect for cultural values. 
51 Id. ch. 4, art. 21. 
52 Id. ch. 4, art. 22. 
53 Id. ch. 4, art. 23. Investors are not to exploit or use them to the detriment of the rights 
and interests of the host state and to respect the rights of the local population as well as to 
avoid land grabbing practices vis-à-vis local communities. 
54 Id. ch. 4, art. 24. 
55 Id. ch. 5, art. 26. 
56 Id. ch. 5, art. 27. 
57 Id. ch. 5, art. 34. 
58 Id. ch. 5, art. 36. 
59 Draft Pan-African Investment Code, supra note 31, ch. 5, art. 29; id. at ch. 5, art. 30. 
60 Id. at ch. 5, art. 37; id. at ch. 5, art. 40. 
61 Id. at ch. 6. 
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the possibility for a state to file a counterclaim against an investor in an 
investor-state arbitration.62 This mechanism is nonexistent in 
traditional investment treaty practice. The counterclaim provision will 
make it possible to legally enforce the investor obligations contained in 
a specific investment treaty. As a result, for instance, a state can invoke 
any violation of any relevant international treaty protecting the 
environment, human rights, and labor standards under the PAIC’s 
provision on counterclaims. The breadth of potential legal bases of a 
state’s counterclaim is thus very large. The PAIC’s dispute settlement 
provisions seek to establish a better balance between the rights and 
obligations of investors and host states. Furthermore, the PAIC 
exempts dispute settlement procedures from the scope of the MFN 
clause.63  
The investment regime espoused in the PAIC is consistent with the 
current global initiatives64 and new generation IIAs65 aimed at 
balancing rights and obligations of host states and investors. In 
contrast, the majority of Africa’s investment treaties do not impose 
direct obligations on foreign investors, which potentially leads to 
unregulated investments.66 However, imposing direct obligations on a 
foreign investor has not yet gained real recognition or traction in 
conventional investment treaty practice,67 yet it is a viable mechanism 
62 Id. at ch. 6, art. 43. 
63 Mouhamadou Madana Kane, The Pan-African Investment Code: A Good First Step, 
But More Is Needed, in COLUMBIA FDI PERSPECTIVES, NO. 217, 2 (Mar. 21, 2018). 
64 E.g., UNCTAD Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (2015) 
and International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Model International 
Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development, (Apr. 2005), https://www.iisd.org/ 
pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf. 
65 See, e.g., Australia-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement, Austl.-Japan, Jan. 15, 
2014, https://dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/jaepa/full-text/Pages/full-text-of-jaepa. 
aspx; Austria-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement, Austria-Republic of Korea, Aug. 
4, 2014; Canada-Cameroon Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can.-Cameroon, Mar. 3, 2014; 
Canada-Côte d’Ivoire Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can.-Côte d’Ivoire, Nov. 30, 2014; 
Canada-Mali Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can.-Mali, June 8, 2014; Canada-Nigeria 
Bilateral Investment Treaty, Can.-Nigeria, May 6, 2014; Canada-Serbia Bilateral 
Investment Treaty, Can.-Serbia, Sept. 1, 2014. 
66 ADELEKE, supra note 10, at 15; see also K. Nowrot, Obligations of Investors, in 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: A HANDBOOK 1155 (Marc Bungenberg et al. eds., 
2015). 
67 Nonetheless, some early treaties included investor obligations. See, e.g., Community 
Investment Code of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries, art. 19, 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF THE GREAT LAKES COUNTRIES, Jan. 31, 1982, 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2400; Charter on a Regime of 
Multinational Industrial Enterprises of Eastern and Southern African States, art. 17, Nov. 
23, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 696. 
2019] The Right to Regulate in Africa’s International 447
Investment Law Regime 
for striking an appropriate balance between investment protection and 
corporate responsibility in host states.68 Nonetheless, a vast majority of 
modern investment treaties are increasingly integrating, such as the 
obligation of foreign investors to comply with all applicable domestic 
law and measures of the host state.69 Mbengue and Schacherer 
emphasize the need to enforce direct obligations for investors, such as 
“the denial of treaty protection for the investor or the possibility of a 
state to file counterclaims in an arbitral proceeding.”70  
As alluded earlier, the PAIC is not legally binding on member states, 
nor investors, nor their investments,71 although the original goal was to 
have a binding instrument replacing the existing intra-African 
investment agreements.72 This does not mean, however, that the PAIC 
is not important in Africa’s investment regulation. The PAIC forms part 
of a broader continental framework, namely Agenda 2063,73 based on 
a “coherent strategic framework for development whose foundation is 
the promotion of a more inclusive and sustainable growth, the engine 
of structural transformation on the continent.”74 The PAIC was 
developed “based on the idea that national, regional, and continental 
dimensions must be taken into consideration in order to propose a 
conducive legal environment to promote the flow of investments in 
68 Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 3, at 435. See also Nowrot, supra note 66, at 1162. 
69 See, e.g., COMESA, Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement Tabled 
Before Legal Affairs Committee, art. 25, http://www.comesa.int/revised-comesa-common-
investment-agreement-tabled-before-legal-affairs-committee/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2018). 
[hereinafter Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement]; SADC Protocol on 
Finance and Investment, Annex 1, art. 10 [hereinafter SADC FIP].  
70 Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 3, at 437. 
71 Draft Pan-African Investment Code, supra note 31, ch. 1, art. 2(1) (The PAIC is a 
“guiding instrument.”). 
72 The legal nature of the PAIC stimulated a hot debate. See Dr. Amr Hedar, The Legal 
Nature of the Draft Pan-African Investment Code and Its Relationship with International 
Investment Agreements, SOUTH CENTRE (Jul. 2017), https://www.southcentre.int/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/IPB9_The-Legal-Nature-of-the-Draft-Pan-African-Investment-
Code-and-its-Relationship-with-International-Investment-Agreements_EN.pdf. 
73 Agenda 2063 is a strategic framework of the African Union for the socioeconomic 
transformation of the continent over the next fifty years. It builds on and seeks to accelerate 
implementation of past and existing continental initiatives for growth and sustainable 
development. More information about Agenda 2063 is available at What is Agenda 2063?, 
AFRICAN UNION AGENDA 2063 (2017), available at https://au.int/en/agenda2063. 
74 2017 AU-ECA Conference of Ministers: Committee of Experts’ Meeting, AFRICAN 
UNION (2017), https://www.tralac.org/news/article/11444-2017-au-eca-conference-of-
ministers-committee-of-experts-meeting.html [hereinafter A.U. (2017)]. 
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Africa, facilitate intra-African trade and promote cross-border 
investment.”75 
The development of the PAIC was Africa’s attempt to shape 
international investment treaty in accordance with its own 
developmental priorities, the so-called Africanization of international 
law.76 This was a reaction to the earlier models of investment regulation 
that have been presumably unfavorable to Africa’s developmental 
interests.77 As UNECA has noted, the PAIC purports to develop “a 
business climate to stimulate investment at national, regional and 
continental levels, and to develop a roadmap and strategy on how 
African countries can adopt this code to their own context.”78 The PAIC 
is therefore a guiding instrument for African countries in investment 
policy-making at the continental, regional, and bilateral level.  
The PAIC can be a useful instrument for the investment protocol for 
the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA)79 as well as 
the investment chapters envisaged in the Tripartite Free Trade 
Agreement (TFTA).80 Both the AfCFTA Agreement and TFTA 
75 Id. 
76 See generally Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 3, at 414–48. See also M.M. 
Mbengue, The Quest for a Pan-African Investment Code to Promote Sustainable 
Development (June 21, 2016), available at https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-
africa/news/the-quest-for-a-pan-african-investment-code-to-promote-sustainable. 
77 ADELEKE, supra note 10, at 8.  
78 UNECA (2016), supra note 1, at 36. 
79 The AfCFTA is a free trade agreement between fifty member states of the African 
Union, whose primary objective is to establish a single continental market for goods, 
services, and investments. See CFTA—Continental Free Trade Area, AFRICAN UNION, 
https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about (last accessed Apr. 15, 2019). Article 8(2) of the AfCFTA 
Agreement provides that the agreement will contain a Protocol on Investment (to be 
negotiated in Phase II Negotiations), which will form an integral part of the Agreement. See 
Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, AFRICAN  
UNION, art. 8(2) (Mar. 21, 2018), https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/36437-treaty-
consolidated_text_on_cfta_-_en.pdf. Additionally, Article 23 of the AfCFTA Agreement 
prescribes that the Agreement will enter into force once ratified by twenty-two member 
states. See id. 
80 The TFTA Agreement is a free trade agreement between three regional economic 
communities: the East African Community, the Southern African Development Community, 
and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa. The TFTA Agreement is 
essentially a trade in goods agreement but contains rendezvous clauses expressing the 
intention of the parties to enter discussion (in Phase II Negotiation) on investment (trade in 
services; competition policy, trade and development, and intellectual property rights). See 
Article 45(1) of the TFTA Agreement. The TFTA Agreement is not yet legally binding; it 
will enter into force once ratified by fourteen member states. See Agreement Establishing a 
Tripartite Free Trade Area Among the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 
the East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community, art. 39, 
(June 10, 2015), https://www.tralac.org/news/article/7646-signed-agreement-establishing- 
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Agreement are intended to be binding instruments.81 A binding 
instrument at the continental level guarantees that right to regulate 
provisions are preserved in new bilateral investment treaties negotiated 
by African countries. Additionally, a Pan-African wide, binding 
instrument that allows African countries to speak with a single voice 
on investment creates leverage when negotiating investment deals with 
other non-African states and the international business community. 
III 
AFRICAN REGIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
Africa’s Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have adopted 
regional agreements of relevance to investment called intra-African 
Regional Investment Agreements (RIAs). For example, the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) adopted the 
Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area 
(COMESA Common Investment Agreement),82 the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) adopted the Finance and 
Investment Protocol (SADC FIP)83 and the SADC Model BIT,84 the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted the 
Supplementary Act adopting Community Rules on Investment and the 
Modalities for their Implementation with ECOWAS (ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act)85 and the ECOWAS Energy Charter,86 and the 
East African Community (EAC) has adopted the Model Investment 
a-tripartite-free-trade-area-among-comesa-the-eac-and-sadc.html [hereinafter TFTA
Agreement].
81 See AfCFTA, art. 23; TFTA Agreement, supra note 80, art. 39. 
82 See Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, UNCTAD 
(May 23, 2007), https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreement/ 
treatyfiles/3092/download [hereinafter COMESA Investment Agreement].  
83 SADC FIP was adopted and signed in 2006 and entered into force on Apr. 16, 2010. 
See Talkmore Chidede, Investment Dispute Resolution Under the Amended Annex 1 
of the SADC FIP (2018), https://www.tralac.org/blog/article/13526-investment-dispute-
resolution-under-the-amended-annex-1-of-the-sadc-fip.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2019). 
84 SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template, SADC (Jul. 2012), 
https://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf. 
85 Supplementary Act Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the Modalities for 
Their Implementation with ECOWAS was adopted and signed in December 2008. 
Supplementary Act A/SA.3/12/08 Adopting Community Rules on Investment and the 
Modalities for their Implementation with ECOWAS, ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF  
WEST AFR. STATES, Dec. 19, 2008, https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/ 
TreatyFile/3266 [hereinafter ECOWAS Supplementary Act]. 
86 ECOWAS Energy Protocol was adopted and signed on Jan. 31, 2003. 
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Code (EAC Model Investment Code).87 In addition, other African 
regional blocs whose constituency spreads beyond the continent have 
also adopted a comprehensive “and less systematic compilation of 
substantive and procedural provisions on investment.”88 Similarly, 
African countries have negotiated or are negotiating Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the European Union as part of 
their central, eastern, western, and southern African regional blocs.89 
EPAs essentially concern trade and development but also include 
provisions related to the promotion and protection of foreign 
investment as well as rendezvous clauses for future negotiations in 
areas of investment, trade in services, public procurement, and 
competition.90 Furthermore, the United States has executed Trade and 
87 EAC Model Investment Code, 2006. 
88 Erik Denters & Tarcisco Gazzini, The Role of African Regional Organisations in the 
Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investment, 18 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 451, 457 
(2017). For example, the Community Investment Code of the ECGLC, which was adopted 
on Jan. 31, 1982, (available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/ 
TreatyFile/2400) and entered into force on Oct. 4, 1987; the Arab Maghreb Union 
Investment Agreement, which was adopted on Jul. 23, 1990, and is not yet in force (available 
at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2405); the Common 
Convention in Investments in the States of the Customs and Economic Union of Central 
Africa, adopted on Dec. 14, 1965, and entered into force Apr. 1, 1966 (available at 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2388); the Agreement on 
Promotion, Protection and Guarantee of Investments Among Member States of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference, adopted on June 5, 1981, entered into force on Sept. 
23, 1986 (available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2399); 
the Agreement on Investment and Free Movement of Arab Capital Among Arab Countries, 
signed and entered into force on Aug. 29, 1970 (available at https://investmentpolicyhub. 
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2390).  
89 These EPAs are available at the European Commission website: http://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/tradehelp/economic-partnership-agreements-epas. 
90 See, e.g., Article 53 of the EPA between the European Union and the Eastern and 
Southern Africa States, 2007; Chapter IX of the EPA between the European Union and 
SADC EPA States, 2016; Article 3 of the EPA between the European Union and EAC, 2014; 
Article 106 of the EPA between the European Union and the West African states, 2014; and 
Title V of the EPA between the European Union and Central Africa, 2009. 
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Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with EAC,91 COMESA,92 
SACU,93 and ECOWAS.94  
Intra-African RIAs reflect a remarkable attempt to incorporate host 
states’ right to regulate. As Denters and Gazzini concede: 
The content of African regional treaties must be appreciated also 
from the standpoint of the second concern mentioned above, namely 
risk that investment agreements could unduly limit the sovereignty 
of host states, curtail their regulatory powers and ultimately 
undermine their capacity to develop efficient policies, in particular in 
the field of the protection of the environment and public health.95  
In the next Part, I will analyze whether intra-African RIAs 
effectively preserve the regulatory autonomy of host states. 
IV 
SADC FIP 
SADC FIP is legally binding on state parties.96 The SADC FIP was 
adopted to promote the harmonization of financial and investment 
policies of the state parties through alignment with the SADC 
objectives.97 Annex 1 to the SADC FIP was amended in 2016 by the 
Agreement Amending Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and Investment 
91 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the United States and EAC, 
which was signed on Jul. 16, 2008, and entered into force on Jul. 16, 2008. 
92 Agreement Between COMESA and the United States Concerning the Development 
of Trade and Investment Relations, which was signed on Oct. 29, 2001, and entered into 
force on Oct. 29, 2001. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Afr.-U.S., Oct. 29, 2001, 
Hein’s No. KAV 8971. 
93 Cooperative Agreement Between the United States and the SACU to Foster Trade, 
Investment and Development, signed on Jul. 16, 2008, and entered into force on Jul. 16, 
2008. Cooperative Agreement Between the United States of America and the Southern 
African Customs Union to Foster Trade, Investment, and Development, Southern African 
Customs Union-U.S., Jul. 16, 2008, T.I.A.S No. 08-716-2. 
94 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Economic Community of West African States, Economic 
Community of West African States-U.S., Aug. 5, 2014, available at https://investment 
policyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/5102. 
95 Denters & Gazzini, supra note 88, at 481. 
96 Talkmore Chidede, Amendment of Annex 1 to the SADC Finance and Investment 
Protocol: Are They in Force Yet?, TRALAC (Jul. 13, 2017), https://www.tralac.org/ 
discussions/article/11875-amendments-of-annex-1-to-the-sadc-finance-and-investment-
protocol-are-they-in-force-yet.html. 
97 See SADC FIP, supra note 69, art. 2(1). The objectives of SADC are outlined in 
Article 5 of the SADC Treaty (2002). 
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Protocol (Amended Annex).98 The Amended Annex entered into force 
in August 2017, upon adoption by three-quarters of all state parties, and 
it subsequently replaced or modified most of the investment protection 
standards provided under the original Annex.99 For example, the 
Amended Annex elaborates more comprehensively than the original 
Annex on provisions regarding each host state’s right to regulate with 
respect to domestic health, safety, and environmental protection.100 
Article 11 of the Amended Annex stipulates: 
State parties recognise that it is inappropriate to encourage 
investment by relaxing domestic health, safety and environmental 
measures and agree not to waive or otherwise derogate from, 
international treaties they have ratified, or offer to waive or otherwise 
derogate from, such measures as an encouragement for the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in their territories, 
of an investment.101 
This provision reiterates state parties’ international obligations on 
the protection of health, safety, and environmental standards. The right 
for a host state to adopt environmental measures has increasingly 
become part of modern IIA practice, and most treaties contain 
provisions specifically addressing the relationship between investment 
and the environment.102 The non-lowering standards103 are inserted to 
prevent race-to-the-bottom actions by host states in a bid to lure 
investments.104 Measures directed at environmental protection in IIAs 
98 Agreement Amending Annex 1 (Co-operation on Investment) of the Protocol on 
Finance and Investment, Aug. 31, 2016, available at https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad. 
org/Download/TreatyFile/5527. 
99 See Summary of the Key Amendments to Annex 1 of the SADC Finance and Investment 
Protocol, PARLIAMENTARY MONITORING GROUP, http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/150922summary.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2019).
100 See SADC FIP, supra note 69, Annex 1, art. 13 and 14. These articles discuss
environmental protection and right to regulate, respectively. 
101 Agreement Amending Annex 1, supra note 98, art. 11. 
102 Lise Johnson & Lisa Sachs, International Investment Agreements, 2011–2012: A 
Review of Trends and New Approaches, in Y.B. INT’L INVESTMENT LAW & POL. 2012–
2013 219, 234 (Andrea K. Bjorklund ed., 2014); See JORGE E. VIÑUALES, FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012). 
103 Non-lowering standards are rules prohibiting states from lowering their labor, human 
rights, or environmental protection standards in order to lure foreign investments. See, e.g., 
2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, art. 12. 
104 A good example of race-to-the-bottom actions in southern Africa is illustrated by the 
relocation of Ramatex Company from South Africa to Namibia in the early 2000s. See 
Herbert Jauch, Africa’s Clothing and Textile Industry: The Case of Ramatex in Namibia, in 
THE FUTURE OF THE TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, 212–
25 (Herbert Jach & Rudolf Traub-Merz eds., 2006).  
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guarantee the host states’ right to regulate in the field of 
environment.105 
In addition, the Amended Annex preserves the right of host states to 
take regulatory measures to ensure that development in their territory 
is consistent with the sustainable development and legitimate social and 
economic policy objectives. In particular, article 12 provides: 
(1) In accordance with customary international law and other
general principles of international law, the Host State has the
right to take regulatory or other measures to ensure that
development in its territory is consistent with the goals and
principles of sustainable development, and with other legitimate
social and economic objectives.
(2) Except where the rights of a Host State are expressly stated as an
exception to the obligations of this Annex, as Host State’s
pursuit of its rights to regulate shall be understood as embodied
within a balance of the rights and obligations of investors and
investments and host states, as set out in this Annex.
(3) Non-discriminatory measures taken by a state party to comply
with its international obligations under other treaties shall
constitute a breach of this Annex.106
A reading of the above provisions shows that under the Amended 
Annex, SADC host states preserve a right to regulate investments in 
accordance with their development goals and in line with customary 
international law and other general principles of international law. This 
is contrary to the original Annex, which merely provided that a state 
party is allowed to “exercise[e] its right to regulate in the public interest 
and to adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns.”107 These kind of 
provisions establish vague standards and can be broadly interpreted. 
article 12 of the Amended Annex further requires host states to balance 
their regulatory autonomy with the rights and obligations on 
investments provided under the SADC FIP.108  
105 See generally ÅSA ROMSON, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY SPACE AND INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (2012). 
106 Agreement Amending Annex 1, supra note 98, art. 12. 
107 SADC FIP, supra note 69, Annex 1, art. 14. 
108 Agreement Amending Annex 1, supra note 98, art. 12(2). 
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A. COMESA Common Investment Agreement
The COMESA Common Investment Agreement was adopted in 
2007 and revised in 2017109 with the objective of promoting 
investments that will foster sustainable development in COMESA 
member states and designating COMESA as an attractive investment 
region to investors from within and outside COMESA.110 As such, 
member states are required to gradually eliminate “investment 
restrictions and conditions, which may impede investment flows and 
the operation of investment projects in COMESA and promote a more 
transparent investment environment.”111 The agreement is not in force 
yet; it will enter into force once ratified by at least two-thirds of the 
member states.112 The Revised COMESA Common Investment 
Agreement reveals some concerted efforts to integrate the regulatory 
autonomy of host states. 
The agreement permits member states to adopt measures aimed at 
redressing historically based economic inequalities “suffered by 
identifiable ethnic or cultural groups due to discriminatory or 
oppressive measures against such groups.”113 This is justified in the 
context of preserving the regulatory autonomy of the host states to 
support the economic development and equality of their citizens. This 
provision is applied as a specific exception to national treatment and 
most-favored-nation treatment standards embedded in articles 17 and 
18 of the Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement. South 
Africa and Zimbabwe are among the African countries that have 
adopted robust policies aimed at redressing historically based 
economic disparities.114  
In addition, the Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement 
allows member states to adopt or enforce measures designed to protect 
national security, public morals, human, animal and plant life or health, 
and the environment.115 COMESA member states are permitted to 
adopt and enforce such measures, provided they are not arbitrary or 
109 Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement, supra note 69.  
110 Id. arts. 2(a), 2(e).  
111 Id. art. 2(b). 
112 See id. art. 42(1).  
113 Id. art. 19(2). 
114 See South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment Policy; see also Zimbabwe’s 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Policies, which are regulated through the 
Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (as amended) and the 
Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act, Chapter 14:33 2007 (as amended).  
115 Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement, supra note 69, art. 22(1). 
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unjustifiably discriminatory between investors or restrict investment 
flows.116 Furthermore, the Revised COMESA Common Investment 
Agreement explicitly provides for the member states’ “right to deny an 
investor the benefits” provided under the agreement “and to grant 
special and differential treatment to any investor and investment in 
such cases, where the investor is engaged in activities inimical to the 
economic and security interest of the Member State.”117  
The Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement also 
provides for the imposition of safeguard measures.118 The tradition of 
imposing safeguard measures is common in international trade law but 
rare or nonexistent in international investment treaty practice.119 In the 
context of international trade, a safeguard is a provisional safety valve 
providing countries flexibility to legally escape their liberalization 
commitments in order to assist the endangered domestic industry.120 
COMESA states are allowed to impose safeguard measures if, as a 
result of opening up economic activities pursuant to the agreement, the 
member state is suffering or is threatened with any serious balance of 
payment or external financial difficulties.121 COMESA member states 
are permitted to adopt such safeguard measures provided they are 
temporary and to be progressively eliminated, nondiscriminatory 
among member states, compatible with article VIII of the agreement of 
the International Fund, and not detrimental to other members’ 
commercial, economic, and financial interests.122 
Nevertheless, the Revised COMESA Common Investment 
Agreement dedicates a whole chapter to investor and investment 
obligations.123 Article 25 of the Revised COMESA Common 
Investment Agreement requires investors and their investments to 
comply with all applicable domestic measures of the member state 
where their investments are made or constituted.124 COMESA investors 
116 Id.  
117 Id. art. 22(3). 
118 Id. art. 24.  
119 See Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio, Safeguarding Policy Space in Investment 
Agreements, INST. OF INT’L ECONOMIC LAW (Dec. 2017), https://object. 
cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/lester-mercurio-iiel-issue-brief-december-2017.pdf. 
120 Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism As a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT 
“Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 255–56 (1991). 
121 Revised COMESA Common Investment Agreement, supra note 69, art. 24(1). 
122 Id. art. 24(3). 
123 Id. pt. 4. 
124 Id. art. 25. 
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and investments are also required to comply with national and 
internationally accepted standards of corporate governance;125 adhere 
to sociopolitical obligations;126 refrain from bribery and corruption;127 
observe the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights with modifications necessary for local circumstances;128 comply 
with their corporate social responsibility;129 and protect, manage, and 
improve the environment.130 Although quite unusual in investment 
treaty practice, article 33 of the Revised COMESA Common 
Investment Agreement permits the host state to initiate proceedings 
against a COMESA investor or investment in its domestic courts for 
breaching obligations under the Agreement.131 This is an innovative 
provision that gives the host states the right to file a claim against 
investors and investments for breaching their social, economic, or 
political obligations in the territory of the host state. Such provisions 
are not found in traditional BITs. Equally, article 36(7) of the Revised 
COMESA Common Investment Agreement provides for counter 
claims by member states.132 The counter claim provision will allow a 
COMESA member state complained against to  
assert as a defence, counterclaim, right of set off or other similar 
claim, that the COMESA investor bringing the claim has not fulfilled 
its obligations under this Agreement, including the obligations to 
comply with all applicable domestic measures or that it has not taken 
all reasonable steps to mitigate possible damages.133 
B. ECOWAS Supplementary Act
The ECOWAS Supplementary Act is legally binding on ECOWAS 
member states, investors, and investments.134 The Act is one of the 
most advanced investment treaties that is conscious of the distinctive 
“context of African countries and adopts rights-based approach to 
development.”135 Its declared objective is to stimulate investment that 
125 Id. art. 26. 
126 Id. art. 27. 
127 Id. art. 28. 
128 Id. art. 29. 
129 Id. art. 30. 
130 Id. arts. 31, 32. 
131 Id. art. 33. 
132 Id. art. 36(7). 
133 Id. art. 28(9).  
134 See generally ECOWAS Supplementary Act, supra note 85, art. 4. 
135 ADELEKE, supra note 10, at 144. 
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can promote sustainable development within the ECOWAS.136 Article 
20 prohibits member states from relaxing their labor, public health, 
safety, or environmental standards to lure investment into their 
territories.137 In terms of article 24(2) host states can 
impose performance requirements to promote domestic development 
benefits from investments. Measures adopted prior to the completion 
of the host State measures prescribing the formalities for establishing 
an investment shall be deemed to be in compliance with this 
Supplementary Act. If such measures are taken after the completion 
of the host State measures prescribing the formalities for establishing 
an investment, they shall be subject to the provisions of this 
Supplementary Act.138  
Article 24(3) of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act provides for 
examples of the performance requirements covered in article 24(2) to 
include the following: 
(a) to export a given level or percentage of goods or services;
(b) to achieve a given level or percentage of domestic content;
(c) to purchase, use or accord a preference to goods produced or
services provided in its territory;
(d) to purchase goods or services from persons in its territory;
(e) to relate the volume or value of imports to the volume or value
of exports or to the amount of foreign exchange flows associated
with such investment;
(f) to restrict sales of goods or services in its territory that such
investment produces by relating such sales to the volume or
value of its exports or foreign exchange earnings; and
(g) similar measures intended to promote domestic development.139
Additionally, a host state can apply measures that it considers 
necessary for the fulfilment of its obligations under the United Nations 
Charter:140 “[W]ith respect to the maintenance or restoration of 
international peace or security, or for the protection of its own essential 
security interests.”141 The ECOWAS Supplementary Act does not 
prohibit host states from adopting or applying any measures aimed at 
136 ECOWAS Supplementary Act, supra note 85, art. 3. 
137 Id. art. 20. 
138 Id. art. 24(2). 
139 Id. art. 24(3). 
140 United Nations Charter, Oct. 24, 1945, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI. 
141 ECOWAS Supplementary Act, supra note 85, art. 37. 
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promoting the “achievement of equality in its territory, or designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
long-term historic discrimination in its territory.”142  
Moreover, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act provides for ISDS and 
interstate dispute settlement through the use of good offices, 
conciliation, mediation, or any other dispute resolution process as 
agreed upon.143 Article 33(5) of the Act provides that “[m]ember states 
may also establish national mediation centers to facilitate the resolution 
of disputes between parties and investors or investments, taking into 
account regional rules, customs and traditions on investment.”144 If a 
dispute between an investor and a member state is not settled through 
good offices, conciliation, or mediation, it may be submitted to 
arbitration under a domestic court; “any national machinery for settling 
investment disputes;”145 “the relevant national court of the member 
states;”146 or referred to the ECOWAS Court of Justice.147 
Chapter III of the ECOWAS Supplementary Act is dedicated to 
obligations and duties of investors. The chapter contains investors’ 
obligations and duties including, among others, complying with 
environmental and sociocultural standards,148 labor standards,149 anti-
corruption practices,150 hygiene, security, health, social welfare rules, 
and human rights.151 Investors are also required to comply with 
corporate governance and corporate social responsibility practices,152 
and they are liable for any civil actions leading to significant damage, 
personal injuries, or loss in the host state.153  
Quite uniquely, the ECOWAS Supplementary Act contains rights 
and obligations for home states.154 The Act enjoins home states to assist 
and facilitate cross-border investments and provide information 
necessary for the host state to meet its obligations, and perform its 
142 Id. art. 38(1). 
143 Id. art. 33. 
144 Id. art. 33(5). 
145 Id. art. 33(6)(b). 
146 Id. art. 33(6). 
147 Id. art. 33(7). 
148 Id. art. 12. 
149 Id. art. 14(2). 
150 Id. art. 13. 
151 Id. art. 14. 
152 Id. art. 17. 
153 Id. art. 17. 
154 Id. at ch. 6. 
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duties in relation to investors and investments. It also requires a home 
state to provide “information relevant to the home state standards that 
might apply under like circumstances to the investment proposed by its 
investor, including but not limited to the home state’s environmental 
and social public health impact assessment process.”155 Article 29 
require member states to  
ensure that their legal systems and rules allow for, or do not prevent 
or unduly restrict, the bringing of court actions on their merits before 
domestic courts relating to the civil liability of investors for damages 
resulting from alleged acts or decisions made by investors in relation 
to their investments in the territory of other member states.156  
In addition, the Act requires home states to provide “information that 
might assist a dispute settlement tribunal under this Supplementary Act 
in determining whether there has been a breach of an anti-corruption 
obligation.”157 
C. EAC Model Investment Code
The EAC Model Investment Code is not a binding legal instrument 
but a guiding instrument whose features may be incorporated by the 
EAC member states into their national laws.158 The Code was adopted 
with the overall aim of improving the business climate within the 
region and harmonizing investment laws and policies of member states. 
It seeks to facilitate the adoption of transparent, predictable regulations 
and laws for investors, especially in matters relating to compensation 
for loss of investment and dispute settlement mechanisms. The EAC 
Model Investment Code provides for national treatment and 
nondiscrimination of foreign investors,159 prohibits expropriation 
except in public interest in accordance to the due process of the law and 
on payment of fair and adequate compensation within a reasonable 
time,160 allows for free transfer of assets and capital,161 and permits 
investors to submit investment disputes to international arbitration 
155 Id. art. 28(2). 
156 Id. art. 29. 
157 Id. art. 30(3). 
158 East African Community Secretariat [EAC], East African Model Investment Code, 
arts. 5, 3(1) (Jul. 2006), https://www.tralac.org/documents/resources/eac/1378-eac-model-
investment-code-july-2006/file.html. 
159 Id. art. 5. 
160 Id. art. 14. 
161 Id. art. 13. 
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under ICSID rules.162 More importantly, the EAC Model Investment 
Code incorporates provisions on special economic zones, covering 
fiscal and non-fiscal incentives as well as ceilings or limits to them.163 
Similar provisions are quite rare in regional investment treaties, 
regulations, laws, or policies in Africa and beyond.  
The EAC Model Investment Code is a step in the right direction 
toward developing a regional approach to investment. Then again, 
history has shown that African states generally make no use of their 
own Model BITs, and when negotiating and signing BITs with third 
parties, Model BITs of the European or North-American states are 
followed.164 
V 
AFRICAN INVESTMENT REGULATION AT THE BILATERAL LEVEL 
Despite the extensive legislative infrastructure at the disposal of the 
international investment community for the promotion and protection 
of investors, BITs have emerged as the main legal instruments to 
protect investors, provide them with rights and benefits, and deal with 
investment disputes. Traditionally, BITs have been concluded between 
developing and developed countries (North-South BITs), but the trend 
has changed in recent decades as BITs are also being concluded among 
developing countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America (South-
South BITs).165 Alschner and Skougarevskiy have detected that the 
South-South BITs contain more public interest and host state 
regulatory autonomy elements than North-South BITs.166 
African countries have signed 881 BITs, 722 of which are signed 
with non-African countries and 159 of which are signed between 
African countries (intra-African BITs).167 The greater part of these 
162 Id. art. 15(3). 
163 EAC, supra note 158, pt. 4. 
164 Eric De Brabandere, Fair and Equitable Treatment and (Full) Protection and 
Security in African Investment Treaties: Between Generality and Contextual Specificity, 18 
J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 530, 531 (2017).
165 See generally Lauge Skovgaard Poulsen, The Politics of South-South Bilateral
Investment Treaties, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 186 (Tomer 
Broude et al. eds., 2011). See also Stephan W. Schill, Special Issue: Dawn of an Asian 
Century in International Investment Law, 16 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 765, 765 (2015). 
166 Alschner & Skougarevskiy, supra note 29, at 10. 
167 Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 3, at 416. See International Investment 
Agreement Database, UNCTAD, https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA (last visited 
Mar. 18, 2019).  
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treaties were concluded in the late 1990s and early 2000s.168 The 
content of these BITs have been largely dictated by developed 
countries, particularly countries from Western Europe and North 
America.169 African countries were presented with “take-it-or-leave-it” 
offers by developed countries in the negotiation of investment 
treaties.170 The existing network of traditional BITs entered into by 
African countries with their western trade and investment partners are 
biased in favor of foreign investors—who seem to enjoy greater 
privileges than their African or domestic counterparts when investing 
in Africa.171 As UNECA opines, “[T]his generally comes at the expense 
of countries’ ability to formulate and pursue autonomous development 
policies, and has not proven to attract more investment into the 
continent.”172  
Furthermore, the BITs signed by African countries are weak in 
leveraging and imposing obligations on investors, and the BITs tend to 
favor foreign investors without addressing questions of economic 
sustainability for the continent.173 For instance, BITs have established 
a situation in which foreign investors can bypass local courts of the host 
states and submit their investment claims directly to international 
arbitral tribunals mostly based overseas.174 UNECA has observed that 
African countries find themselves exposed to the risk of legal disputes 
and hefty fines “which put a further strain on scant government 
resources and narrow the policy space when designing policies which 
touch on investment.”175 
168 Id.; see also Mbengue & Schacherer, supra note 3, at 416. 
169 Layrea & Sucker, supra note 28, at 10. 
170 Gus Van Harten, A Critique of Investment Treaties, in RETHINKING BILATERAL 
INVESTMENT TREATIES: CRITICAL ISSUES AND POLICY CHOICES 41, 50 (Kavaljit Singh & 
Burghard Ilge eds., 2016). 
171 Masamba, supra note 11. 
172 The Pan African Investment Code and the Investment Chapter of the CFTA: 
Opportunities for Rationalising Investment Regulation in Africa, Concept Note for the High-
Level International Investment Agreements Conference 2017, UNECA, http://investment 
policyhub.unctad.org/Upload/Documents/UNECA%20Final%20Side%20event%20Agend
a.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) [hereinafter UNECA (2017)].
173 UNECA (2016), supra note 1, at 39.
174 See, e.g., ICSID, UNCITRAL, the International Chamber of Commerce, the
International Court of Arbitration, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the International 
Court of Justice, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, and the 
London Court of International Arbitration. 
175 UNECA (2017), supra note 172. 
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A growing number of these cases have been brought by foreign 
investors against African countries. Since 1972, 111 treaty-based ISDS 
cases involving African countries have been recorded, sixty-eight of 
which ended up in awards, settlements, or were discontinued, while 
forty-four are pending.176 The ICSID has been responsible for 107 
cases, while the UNCITRAL tribunals have handled three cases.177 
Signing and ratifying BITs comes with great risk of investment dispute 
proceedings. It appears that an increase in BITs worldwide correlates 
with an increase in investment dispute proceedings. The more BITs 
African countries enter into, the more they will be parties in dispute 
settlement proceedings. Egypt is the African country with the highest 
number of BITs, having entered 100 BITs,178 and is also the African 
country with the highest number of ISDS cases: Egypt is a respondent 
in twenty-nine cases.179  
There has been strong opposition to ISDS international arbitration 
among African countries.180 Overall, this antipathy has exceedingly 
surfaced across the world, even with traditional capital-exporting 
countries such as the United States,181 the E.U. countries, Australia, and 
Canada sharing the same view.182 ISDS international arbitration 
opponents have raised concerns about the international arbitral 
tribunals’ legitimacy and ability to assess government actions as well 
as their lack of transparency, independence, impartiality, and 
inconsistent application and interpretation of investment treaty 
176 See Investment Dispute Settlement Database, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Mar. 10, 2019). 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
179 See id. 
180 See Kidane (2018); Kinda Mohamadieh & Daniel Uribe, The Rise of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement in the Extractive Sectors: Challenges and Considerations for African 
Countries (2016), https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/RP65_Rise-of-
investor-state-dispute-settlement-in-extrative-sectors_EN.pdf. 
181 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been amended by the 
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, 2018 [hereinafter USMCA]. The USMCA, 
among other things, amended the ISDS mechanism in NAFTA. See Chapter 14 of the 
USMCA. For discussions, see, e.g., Matti Lemmens & Tiffany Bennett, The Impact of 
USMCA on Investor-State Disputes and the Energy Industry (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=28553ff1-c132-477d-932e-
ccb502764939; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, USMCA Curbs How Much Investors Can 
Sue Countries—Sort Of (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.iisd.org/library/usmca-investors.  
182 See Kenneth Vandevelde, A Comparison of the 2004 and 1994 US Model Bits: 
Rebalancing Investor and Host Country Interests, in 1 Y.B. ON INT’L INVESTMENT L. AND 
POL’Y. 283 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009).  
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provisions.183 ISDS arbitration has caused many African governments 
to pay substantial fines to foreign companies. For example, in Al-
Kharafi v. Libya,184 an international tribunal held the government of 
Libya liable for more than $900 million U.S. dollars for a canceled 
investment project where the investor had invested only $130,000 U.S. 
dollars in service fees in Libya.  
ISDS arbitration has also discouraged African governments from 
adopting regulations for public interests, resulting in a regulatory chill 
effect or undermining of state sovereignty.185 In Foresti v. South 
Africa,186 foreign investors challenged South Africa’s set of black 
economic empowerment policies, claiming that they violated South 
Africa’s investor protection obligations of no expropriation without 
compensation, fair and equitable treatments, as well as national 
treatment standards enshrined in BITs signed by South Africa with 
Italy and Luxembourg.187 It is against this background that the 
government of South Africa decided to review and unilaterally 
terminate its BITs with several E.U. countries and Switzerland in 
2013.188 The South African government expressed its desire to protect 
policy space, discontentment with ISDS international arbitration in 
relation to arbitrary and inconsistent awards, and a dearth of sufficient 
evidence that the BITs promote FDI in South Africa.189 Members of the 
South African government argued that the BITs signed by the country 
immediately after independence in 1994, inter alia, provided more 
protection to foreign investors than to domestic investors and allowed 
183 JOHAN BILLIET, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: A PRACTICAL 
HANDBOOK 84–85 (2016). 
184 Mohamed Abdulmohsen Al-Kharafi & Sons Co. v. Libya, Arbitrarion Award 386, 
181 (2013), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1554.pdf. 
185 See generally Trisha Menon & Gladwin Issac, Developing Country Opposition to An 
Investment Court: Could State-State Dispute Settlement Be an Alternative? (Feb. 17, 2018), 
http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/02/17/developing-country-opposition-
investment-court-state-state-dispute-settlement-alternative/. 
186 Piero Foresti et al. v. Rep. of S. Afr., ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/01, Award (Aug. 
2010). 
187 Id. ¶¶ 58, 70. 
188 See Engela C. Schlemmer, An Overview of South Africa’s Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Investment Policy, 31 ICSID R. FOREIGN INV. L.J. 167, 167 (2016). 
189 See generally Jonathan Klaaren & David Schneiderman, Investor-State Arbitration 
and SA’s Bilateral Investment Treaty Policy Framework Review, WIREDSPACE.COM (Aug. 
10, 2009), http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/jspui/bitstream/10539/9205/1/SABITPolicyReview 
CommentsKlaarenandSchneiderman10Aug2.pdf.  
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foreign investors to challenge the public policy measures of the 
government before international arbitral tribunals.190 
Accordingly, South Africa enacted the Protection of Investment Act 
in 2015 to protect (domestic and foreign) investment in accordance 
with and subject to the constitution,191 and in a manner which balances 
the public interest and rights and obligations of investors.192 Section 
12(1) of the Protection of Investment Act further allows the 
government to take necessary measures for the fulfilment of its 
obligations in regard to the maintenance, compliance, or restoration of 
international peace and security, or the protection of the security 
interests, including the financial stability of the country. Adeleke has 
supported these provisions, stating that they ensure the protection of 
investment in South African and do not hamper the government’s 
legitimate obligation to protect public interests.193 
Notwithstanding the foregoing arguments, it must be acknowledged 
that African countries have recently executed investment treaties that 
attempt to preserve policy space. For example, the investment treaties 
make reference to right to regulate (regulatory autonomy, policy space, 
flexibility to introduce new regulations), sustainable development, social 
investment aspects (human rights, labor, health, corporate social 
responsibility, poverty reduction), or environmental issues (plant or 
animal life, biodiversity, or climate change). Most of these BITs were 
concluded in the twenty-first century and refer to the right to regulate, 
sustainable development, social investment, and environmental aspects in 
their preambles.194 Giannakopoulos opines: 
By incorporating this and similar language to the preambles of their 
IIAs, States indicate that they have multiple goals in mind when 
signing such agreements. They send a clear message to arbitral 
190 See also Xavier Carim, International Investment Agreements and Africa’s Structural 
Transformation: A Perspective from South Africa, 4 S. CTR. INV. POL’Y BRIEF (2015), 
https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/IPB4_IIAs-and-Africa%E2% 
80%99s-Structural-Transformation-Perspective-from-South-Africa_EN.pdf. 
191 S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
192 Protection of Investment Act 22 of 2015 § 4.  
193 ADELEKE, supra note 10, at 135. 
194 See, e.g., For the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, S. Afr.-Eth., 
Mar. 18, 2008; Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, Morocco-
Nigeria, Dec. 3, 2016; Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment, Austria-
Nigeria, Apr. 8, 2013; Acordo de Cooperação e Facilitação de Investimentos [Agreement 
For Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments], Braz.-Angl., Apr. 1, 2015; Investment 
Cooperation and Facilitation Agreement, Braz.-Malawi, June 26, 2015; Agreement Between 
the Government of Canada and the Government of the Republic of Benin for the Promotion 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can-Benin, Sept. 1, 2013. 
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tribunals that investment protection is not the sole or even the primary 
goal of the treaty, but rather that investment policy objectives ought 
to be achieved in a manner that is compatible with other public policy 
objectives.195 
Some connotations of the right to regulate are contained in the general 
exception provisions in BITs; for example, for the protection of human, 
animal, or plant life or health, or the conservation of natural resources.196 
It may be submitted that these exclusions somehow enhance the 
protection of aspects of legitimate public welfare such as public health, 
safety, and the environment. 
The inclusion of these public policy considerations in BITs with 
African countries has been because of change in treaty policy by countries 
such as Canada.197 However, these provisions—specifically the 
preambles—are weak when it comes to the enforcement of the right to 
regulate in public interest and sustainable development. Under 
international law, preambles are crucial in the interpretation of treaties. 
Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(VCLT)198 stipulates that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”199 
Article 31(2) of the VCLT further provides that a context of a treaty is 
to be interpreted using the agreement’s text, preamble, and annexes. 
Furthermore, article 31(2) states that the context of a treaty can be 
interpreted using any related agreements made between parties 
connected to the treaty and any instrument made by a party connected 
to the treaty that has been accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. Thus “the meaning must merge in the context of 
the treaty as a whole (including the text, its preamble and annexes, and 
195 Charalampos Giannakopoulos, The Right to Regulate in International Investment 
Law and the Law of State Responsibility: A Hohfeldian Approach, 11–12 (2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2962686. 
196 E.g., Pour la Promotion et la Protection Reciproque des Investissements (Agreement 
for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments) art. 3, Madag.-S. Afr., Dec. 13, 
2006; Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement art. 14, Eri.-Uganda, June 30, 2001; 
Accord Concernant la Promotion et la Protection Reciproques des Investissements 
(Agreement on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments), Burundi-Comoros, 
May 18, 2001; and Botswana-Egypt BIT Jul. 2, 2003. 
197 See Canada’s BITs with Tanzania, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, Rwanda, Benin, 
Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Senegal, and Mozambique.  
198 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155 
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any agreement or instrument related to the treaty and drawn up in 
connection with its conclusion) and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”200 The preamble gives arbitrators the object and purpose of 
the treaty.201 The right to regulate in a treaty’s preamble should give the 
arbitrators a principled interpretive stance in determining the legal 
rights and obligations of the disputing parties.202 That notwithstanding, 
international arbitral tribunals, in practice, do not rely on preambular 
language to influence the interpretation of BITs.203 In effect, preambles 
do not create binding substantive obligations, but merely offer 
interpretive guidance to decision makers. That said, negotiating 
substantive treaty provisions that are legally binding and enforceable is 
of paramount importance, particularly when preserving the right to 
regulate in public interest. Such strategic considerations will avoid the 
potential exploitation of BIT rules by foreign investors and arbitral 
tribunals. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to provide a detailed overview of the IIAs 
concluded by African countries at multilateral, continental and 
regional, and bilateral levels to determine whether the agreements 
maintain policy space for African countries to pursue their public 
policy goals. This Article has revealed several issues that need to be 
considered to ensure that Africa’s efforts preserve the regulatory space 
of host states and ensure that their national development goals are not 
undermined at the expense of attracting and protecting foreign 
investments. 
African countries have signed IIAs as incentives for attracting FDI 
from developed countries.204 Developed countries, on the other hand, 
have concluded IIAs to protect their investors and investments from 
200 JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 381 
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Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Phil., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6,
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202 See, e.g., Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision 
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expropriation or nationalization by African governments.205 Developed 
countries were investment-rule makers206 and, accordingly, designed 
investment treaties that were pro-investor and do not contain 
substantial provisions on the host state’s right to regulate. African 
countries, as investment-rule consumers, signed these treaties without 
careful consideration of their nature and content.207 This historical 
account explains the exclusion of policy space in most IIAs executed 
by African countries with developed countries. 
Secondly, this Article reviewed the fact that there is not yet an 
Africa-wide binding instrument on investment. Nonetheless, African 
states have, under the auspices of the African Union, adopted the PAIC, 
an Africa-wide nonbinding instrument shaped in the form of a model 
investment treaty to serve as a guide for African Union members in 
negotiating investment treaties. An appraisal of the PAIC shows that it 
was designed with an African perspective and in line with the 
international initiatives to craft investment treaties that promote 
responsible investments and sustainable development. The PAIC 
contains several Africa-specific and innovative features that 
presumably make it a unique model investment treaty. The PAIC 
contains several important novelties meant to rebalance the rights and 
obligations of the various stakeholders and to safeguard host state 
policy space. The PAIC includes substantive provisions on the host 
country’s right to regulate sustainable development, social investment, 
and environmental aspects, as well as investors’ obligations. However, 
African countries rarely use their model investment treaties when 
negotiating investment agreements.208 
At the regional level, only a handful of RECs have regional 
investment regulations that allow them “to determine appropriate 
investment policies that address their economic interests and protect 
the state right to regulate in public interest while, at the same time, 
defining applicable rules for investment by being rule providers rather 
than rule takers.”209 Intra-African RIAs enshrine investment-related 
rules that protect the needs of African countries, including regulatory 
freedom, the use of domestic courts in resolving investment disputes, 
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and the imposition of direct obligations on foreign investors.210 Further, 
the intra-African RIAs provide a robust platform to designate 
investment regulatory frameworks that preserve policy space and foster 
sustainable development in Africa.211  
The bulk of old-generation BITs executed by African countries are 
weak in leveraging and imposing obligations on investors and tend to 
favor foreign investors without addressing questions of economic 
sustainability for the continent.212 These BITs replicate the agenda of 
developed countries and have not featured public policy provisions.213 
They contain ambiguous provisions which on many occasions have 
resulted in broad and inconsistent interpretation of treaty rights and 
obligations by tribunals. The lack of clarity and precision in the 
investment treaties maximizes the protection of investors by effectively 
expanding the scope of the treaty, and it can also make host states more 
prone to claims arising out of legitimate state measures for the 
protection of public policy. Countries signed BITs without careful 
consideration for the provisions and traded their regulatory space for 
investment commitments. In the absence of a binding multilateral 
treaty on investment, BITs remain the primary source of investment 
protection in Africa and across the world. This means that BITs form 
an integral part of Africa’s international investment law regime. 
Overall, Africa is lagging behind other developing and developed 
regions when it comes to integrating more policy space into investment 
treaties. Therefore, incorporating the right to regulate, sustainable 
development, social investment, and environmental aspects in such 
instruments has the potential to cement the policy space of African 
countries in their international investment law. 
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